AI infrastructure that plans for the cryptography deadline
Bee integrates the three NIST-finalized post-quantum standards - FIPS 203, 204, and 205 - with PQC transport shipping default-on for Enclave Sovereign deployments.
The harvest-now, decrypt-later problem
Traffic recorded today can be decrypted later by a sufficiently capable quantum computer if it was protected only by classical key exchange. For prompts and documents with a long confidentiality horizon - contracts, filings, defense material - the migration clock is set by the data's lifetime, not by when such machines arrive.
NIST finalized its post-quantum standards in August 2024. Bee's position is simple: the platform carries them now, so customers with long-lived data don't have to wait for a re-architecture.
The three standards Bee uses
- →FIPS 203 - ML-KEM (module-lattice key encapsulation): post-quantum key exchange that derives session keys on Bee Enclave Sovereign customer transport.
- →FIPS 204 - ML-DSA (module-lattice signatures): signs server attestations, SDK release artefacts, and - via verifiable agent provenance - every turn of an agentic coding session, so you can prove exactly what the AI did to your codebase and that the record was not altered.
- →FIPS 205 - SLH-DSA (stateless hash-based signatures): a long-lived attestation chain for offline verification and air-gapped deployments.
Where it's on today - stated precisely
Bee Enclave Sovereign customers transact on the post-quantum stack from the first request - no opt-in toggle, no classical-fallback handshake. Public Bee tiers use standard TLS 1.3 today; the public-tier PQC default follows the Sovereign rollout.
That precision matters: a platform that claims blanket “quantum-safe” without saying which paths run which primitives is asking you not to check. Bee's claims are scoped so you can.
Defense in depth around the PQC boundary
- →AES-256-GCM at rest under per-tenant keys - symmetric encryption with margin against quantum attack by construction.
- →Customer-managed keys on Hive and above; HSM-backed roots on Enclave Regulated and Sovereign.
- →Hardware-backed FIDO2 as the only operator path to production; no long-lived static credentials.
- →Each FIPS standard is cited to its NIST source in the TrustHub security centre, so review teams verify against the authority, not our paraphrase.
Frequently asked questions
- Is all Bee traffic post-quantum encrypted today?
- No, and we say so plainly: PQC transport is default-on for Bee Enclave Sovereign deployments today. Public tiers run standard TLS 1.3, with the public-tier PQC default following the Sovereign rollout.
- Which post-quantum algorithms does Bee use?
- Only NIST-finalized standards: ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key encapsulation, ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for signatures. No draft or pre-standard primitives.
- Why does post-quantum matter for an AI platform specifically?
- Prompts and uploaded documents often carry an organisation's most sensitive material, and AI traffic is high-volume and predictable - attractive to record now and decrypt later. PQC key exchange removes that future decryption path.
- Is quantum-safe encryption the same as quantum computing features?
- No - they're separate. Post-quantum cryptography defends against quantum attack. Bee also offers opt-in real-QPU jobs through OpenQuantum, which is a compute capability, not a security control.
- Can we get the PQC posture in writing for a security review?
- Yes - TrustHub documents the algorithms, scope, and NIST sources, and procurement-grade evidence is available under NDA via bee-security@heossi.com.
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